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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In American law, it matters if the crime accused of is defined as a felony rather 
than some lesser offense.  Accused felons are generally accorded more constitutional 
and procedural rights than accused misdemeanants—to the benefit of the accused 
felon.1 It also matters if the crime convicted of is defined as a felony, but to the 
detriment of the felon.  The felony-murder doctrine and habitual offender laws 
increase the punishment given to at least some felons, and the impediments to full 
citizenship imposed on felons even after their sentences have been served2 lead to 
political and economic problems for both the ex-convict and his or her community. 
                                                                
∗Assistant Professor and Law Library Director, University of Baltimore School of Law.  
1
 E.g., presence of the defendant at trial.  1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL 
LAW § 21, at 112-13 (15th ed. 1993).  
2
 E.g., loss of voting rights and exclusion from some occupations.  Id. at 114-15.  There is 
a large and growing literature on collateral consequences of a conviction, which can be traced 
back to the drafting of the Model Penal Code in 1961.  See infra Part III for a review of that 
development. 
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For a policy-maker seeking to affect either the rights of the accused, or the 
challenges faced by ex-convicts, redefining felony to make the term include more or 
fewer crimes would be a useful tool.  Yet the dual effect of such a redefinition—
increasing rights for one group while decreasing them for another—makes this a 
difficult task.  One way to approach this conundrum is to look at the origins of the 
dividing line between felony and misdemeanor and to ask why it is set where it is.  
This Article examines how the present definition of felony was developed 
historically and what implications this may have for policy making in the future. 
Felony is usually defined under American law in terms of the sentence imposed: 
a crime punished by death or incarceration, the incarceration being either in a 
penitentiary (place) or for more than one year (time); other crimes are 
misdemeanors.3  A striking exception is the definition in Maryland, which 
perpetuates the common law: a felony is a crime that was a felony at common law, or 
has been so designated by statute.4  While the alternative, majority definitions (place 
of imprisonment or time of imprisonment) are simpler and more compact, they do 
raise questions: Why define a crime by the place of punishment?  Why choose one 
year as the dividing line between felony and misdemeanor? The answers to those 
questions are found in the early years of the American Republic when the received 
common law was examined in light of new ideas about punishment and the 
accessibility of the law.  It was at that time and in response to those ideas that an 
American definition of “felony” was created.   
In retrospect, a different choice might have been made, and the word “felony” 
might have been omitted from our statutory law.  Surprisingly little deliberation went 
into developing the definition now in general use in American law.  Only by looking 
at the context of that redefinition—especially the penal reform and codification 
movements—can we gain insight into how the creators of the definition would view 
the present controversy over the collateral consequences of a felony conviction.  
Part I of this Article sets out the development of the concept of “felony,” as well 
as a closely related term—“infamous crimes”—in the common law.  Next, it looks at 
two early American reform movements—penal reform and codification of the law—
that together created the impetus to rewrite the criminal law and redefine felony.   
Three different responses to the problem of defining felony in the American 
context are analyzed in Part II: the retention of the common law definition of felony 
in Maryland, the rejection of the term entirely in the influential code drafted for 
Louisiana by Edward Livingston, and its redefinition in the New York Revised 
Statutes of 1829—a work that provided a template for later codification efforts 
throughout the nation. The Article then follows the spread of the definition 
developed for the 1829 New York code to other jurisdictions and its later adoption in 
a revised form by the Model Penal Code.  
Part III looks at the importance of felony as a concept in both substantive and 
procedural law, and it suggests ways that the historical development of the concept 
can inform policy choices in the present. 
This Article concludes that the new definition of felony adopted in1829 by the 
New York revisors reflected their pragmatic approach of choosing a middle path 
between the common law traditionalists, exemplified by Maryland, and the radical 
                                                                
3
 1 TORCIA, supra note 1, § 19, at 109.  
4
 Dutton v. State, 91 A. 417, 419-20 (Md. 1914).  
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reforms enshrined in Livingston’s penal code.  Their choice was an expedient one, 
redefining an outdated term rather than writing it out of the law.  Yet underlying 
their efforts was a belief that punishment was an instrument of moral reformation, a 
way of returning the convicted felon to the community as a productive citizen.  
Creating barriers to a convict’s reentry into society with continuing civil disabilities 
would not have been their intention. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The “fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence”5 
The common law concepts that the United States inherited from England at the 
time of the Revolution had been developing over centuries, and many had 
accumulated multiple meanings or connotations.  Those who chose to accept or adapt 
a common law term to American circumstances often had to choose between 
meanings or reject the term entirely.  The word “felony” was just such a multi-
definitional term and is the focus of this Article.  Another term, “infamous crime,” 
was at common law related to “felony” but, in America, has become almost 
synonymous with it.6  A brief review of how these terms originated and how they 
had evolved up to the time of the early American Republic helps to illuminate the 
choices faced by the American reformers. 
1.  Felony 
In its earliest known form, “felony” was not a criminal act per se but a breach of 
the feudal obligations between lord and vassal,7 and it did not necessarily result in 
the death of the felon.8  Moreover, serious crimes were not necessarily felonies: “A 
mere common crime, however wicked and base, mere wilful homicide, or theft, is 
not a felony; there must be some breach of that faith and trust which ought to exist 
between lord and man.”9  Since ownership of property was bound to the feudal 
relationship, a breach of that nexus led to a forfeiture of goods and the escheat of the 
fief.10   
After the Norman Conquest of England, this basically feudal doctrine was 
reshaped into the common law concept of felony, which included the death penalty 
                                                                
5
 Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914) (“[T]he principles of law [in a 
state civil death statute] . . . had its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and 
doubtless has been brought forward into modern statutes without fully realizing either the 
effect of its literal significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of 
government.”).   
6
 In some jurisdictions, for instance, it is used instead of felony to describe those crimes 
that create additional civil sanctions for the convict.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-101 
(2006). 
7
 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 250 (1976). 
8
 Id. at 237.  
9
 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 304 (2d ed. 1923) (1898). 
10
 Id. at 303-04. 
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and loss of goods and land for a criminal act.11  By the late twelfth century, the 
concept also included disinheritance of the felon’s heirs through corruption of the 
blood.12  
With the fading of the feudal order, felony lost its original meaning of disloyalty 
to the lord and came to mean a serious crime punishable by death.  Hawkins, writing 
in the early eighteenth century, differentiated between felonies at common law13 and 
those statutory crimes that are expressly called felonies or are made capital crimes.14  
The express words were important; a statute that punished a crime with forfeiture—
but did not state that it was a felony—created “a high Misdemeanor, punishable by 
Imprisonment,” not a felony.15  Some remnant of the feudal order remained in the 
crimes of treason (against the monarchy)16 and petit treason (against a master by a 
servant, or against a husband by his wife),17 both of which involved an element of 
disloyalty and were punishable by death.  
Blackstone, looking back at the long history of the term, maintained that “the true 
criterion of felony is forfeiture.”18  Yet, he also acknowledges a change in meaning 
over time: “The idea of felony is, indeed, so generally connected with that of capital 
punishment that we find it hard to separate them . . . .”19  As the definition of felony 
became less definitely tied to forfeiture and the use of capital punishment became 
more general, the number of felonies in English law multiplied.  The traditional 
common law felonies were nine: murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, 
rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny.20  Many more were added by statute.  Francis 
Bacon, writing around 1620, listed some thirty-four felonies, including witchcraft 
and harboring a priest.21  Blackstone lamented that, in his day, “no less than a 
hundred and sixty [offenses] have been declared by act of parliament[] to be felonies 
. . . or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death.”22 
                                                                
11
 GOEBEL, supra note 7, at 278-79. 
12
 Id. at 266-68.  
13
 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 65 (Garland 1978) 
(1716). 
14
 Id. at 106-07.  
15
 Id. at 107.  
16
 Id. at 33. 
17
 Id. at 87-88. 
18
 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 97 (Philadelphia, 




 FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1 
(Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. & Brother 1846). 
21
 FRANCIS BACON, Preparation for the Union of Laws of England and Scotland, in 5 
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 92-96 (Basil Montagu ed., London, William Pickering 1826). 
22
 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 18. 
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This ambiguity in the meaning of felony did not go unnoticed by American legal 
commentators.  Nathan Dane, a Massachusetts lawyer and legislator,23 wrote in 1823 
in a comprehensive treatise on American law: 
[T]he word felony, in the process of many centuries, has derived so many 
meanings from so many parts of the common law, and so many statutes in 
England, and has got to be used in such a vast number of different senses, 
that it is impossible to know precisely in what sense we are to understand 
this word.24  
As to the choice between forfeiture and capital punishment as alternate criteria for 
defining felony, Dane noted that, in American law at that time, “we have many 
felonies, not one punished with forfeiture of estate, and but a very few with death.”25  
Within a few decades, however, American commentators settled on a basic 
common law definition that avoided mention of either forfeiture or punishment and 
proved serviceable in jurisdictions that maintained the common law of crimes: the 
term felony includes the “classic” English felonies26 plus crimes designated as 
felonies by statute.27  
2.  Infamous Crimes 
The word “infamy” is derived from the Latin word infamia.28  In essence, infamia 
worked to deprive the Roman citizen declared infames of certain civic rights, such as 
the ability to vote and hold public office.29  This civic disability flowed from a 
perceived “moral imperfection” in the infames,30 evidenced by conviction of a crime 
or working in a dishonorable trade (such as acting).31   
                                                                
23
 Dane, Nathan, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000027 (last visited Sept. 15, 
2009). 
24
 6 NATHAN DANE, DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 715 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 
1823). 
25
 Id.  
26
 See WHARTON, supra note 20 (citing murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, robbery, 
rape, sodomy, mayhem, and larceny). 
27
 Id.  (“In this country . . . the common law classification has obtained; the principle 
felonies being received as they originally existed, and their number being increased as the 
exigencies of society prompted.”); 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 376 (7th ed. Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1882) (“[W]here no statute has defined 
felony, we look into the books upon common-law crimes, and see what was felony and what 
was not under the older laws of England.”).  
28
 See generally A. H. J. GREENRIDGE, INFAMIA: ITS PLACE IN ROMAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
LAW (London, Henry Frowde & Stevens & Sons, Limited 1894). 
29
 Id. at 105-07.  
30
 Id. at 13. 
31
 Id. at 124. 
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At common law, the term “infamous” came to mean a person rendered incapable 
of being a juror or testifying in court.32  There was, however, always some ambiguity 
as to whether it was the crime committed or the punishment suffered that created the 
infamy.  Hawkins lists treason, felony, piracy, perjury, and forgery as crimes that 
would disable a person as a witness,33 as well as any crime that was punished by the 
pillory, whipping, or branding.34  Later cases, however, differentiate between 
sentencing to the pillory (a public, humiliating punishment) for an offense “contrary 
to the faith, credit, and trust of mankind” such as forgery, versus sentencing for a 
non-infamous offense such as libel.35  It became commonplace to say that “it is not 
the nature of the punishment, but the nature of the crime and conviction, that creates 
the infamy.”36  Yet the older connotation of infamous crime that included infamous 
punishment never completely disappeared.  Like felony, there were two kinds of 
infamy, “one founded in the opinions of the people respecting the mode of 
punishment, the other in the construction of law respecting the future credibility of 
the delinquent.”37   
This alternate “popular” meaning of infamous crimes, based on the mode of 
punishment, was also reflected in the law of defamation where per se slanderous 
words must either endanger the party’s life or subject him or her to infamous 
punishment.38  The rule in defamation sometimes became conflated with that for 
capacity, as evidenced by an 1809 New York slander case where moral turpitude 
replaces threat to life: “the charge, if true, will subject the party . . . to an indictment 
                                                                
32
 4 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW FROM THE TIME OF THE SAXONS, TO THE 
END OF THE REIGN OF PHILLIP AND MARY 275 (2d. ed. Dublin, Luke White 1787).  Reeves 
quotes an old English adage to the effect that one who is forsworn cannot be trusted: “He ne es 
othes worthe that enes gylty of oth braker.”  Id. 
33
 1 HAWKINS, supra note 13, at 432.  
34
 Id. It might be noted that in the case of treason, felony, and piracy—all capital 
offenses—the question of subsequent capacity to testify would rarely arise, at least until 
transportation replaced execution in some cases.  See e.g., James Clarke’s Lessee v. Philip 
Hall, 2 H. & McH. 378 (Md. 1789) where the issue was the competence of a witness who had 
been transported to the American colonies at a time when a sentence of transportation was 
used by English courts for both felonies and lesser crimes. 
35
 R. v. Davis & Carter, (1696) 90 Eng. Rep. 1315 (K.B.).  
36
 See e.g., R. v. Ford, (1700) 91 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B.).  
37
 PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 61 (2d ed. London, B.White & T. Cadell 1771).  It was this 
popular meaning of “infamous” (founded in the opinions of the people) that found its way into 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the phrase “capital or other infamous crime.”  
Id.  (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V).  This view was 
ratified by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885), an opinion that 
essentially merged the definitions of felony and infamous crimes.  Prior to Ex Parte Wilson, 
the courts had used the disqualified-as-witness test to decide if a crime required a grand jury 
indictment.  See e.g., United States v. Yates, 6 Fed. 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1881); United States v. 
Baugh, 1 Fed. 784 (E.D. Va. 1880).  The Founders might have prevented this uncertainty by 
rephrasing the sentence to read—less elegantly—for a crime punishable by death or other 
infamous punishment.  
38
 Ogden v. Turner, (1703) 87 Eng. Rep. 862 (K.B.). 
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for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment.”39  
James Kent, New York’s Chief Justice and then Chancellor of that state’s Court of 
Chancery,40 restated the principle as “there must be not only imprisonment but 
infamous punishment” at risk if a statement is to be slanderous.41  His list of clearly 
infamous punishments is: death, gallows, pillory, branding, whipping, confinement to 
hard labor and ear cropping.42  Kent’s addition of imprisonment at hard labor to the 
list of infamous punishments reflects changes in the attitudes towards punishment in 
post-Revolutionary America, part of a reexamination of the old order by citizens of a 
new nation.  The identification of one sense of the term “infamous crimes” with 
“corporal punishment”—like the identification of one sense of “felony” with “capital 
punishment”—would be a task for legal reformers in the new Republic. 
B.  The Revolution is Not Over 43 
The early nineteenth century was a time of social and political ferment in the 
United States, characterized by an “upsurge of democratic hope” in religious 
communities and the populace at large.44  At the same time, Jacksonian democracy 
brought with it a practical approach towards developing new institutions45 combined 
with a disdain for the existing legal system.46  Two movements among the many 
sweeping the Republic at that time are especially relevant to the redefinition of 
felony: penal reform and codification.   
                                                                
39
 Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809). 
40
 Judith Kaye, Commentaries on Chancellor Kent, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 (1998), 
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/history/pdf/Library/Juidges/Kent.pdf.  
41
 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW WITH 
OCCASIONAL NOTES AND COMMENTS 566 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823).  
42
 Id. at 570.  
43
 BENJAMIN RUSH, Address to the People of the United States, in FRIENDS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION; WRITINGS OF THE OTHER FEDERALISTS 1 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. 
McDowell eds., 1998).  Rush’s speech begins with the observation: “The American war is 
over: but this is far from being the case with the American revolution. . . .  It remains yet to 
establish and perfect our new forms of government; and to prepare the principles, morals, and 
manners of our citizens . . . .” Id.  The speech ends with the declaration: “THE 
REVOLUTION IS NOT OVER!”  Id. at 5. 
44
 NATHAN O. HATCH, The Democratization of Christianity and the Character of American 
Politics, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 92, 95 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990). 
45
 MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN 
JACKSONIAN AMERICA 3-4 (1975). 
46
 LAWRENCE FREDERICK KOHL, POLITICS OF INDIVIDUALISM: PARTIES AND THE AMERICAN 
CHARACTER IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 145, 163-65 (1989).  Yet, an “overwhelming majority” of 
the officials in Jackson’s administration were trained as lawyers.  CRENSON, supra note 45, at 
30.  For a discussion of the different criticisms leveled against the inherited legal system by 
lawyers and laymen, see CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 12-15 
(1981). 
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1.  Penal Reform 
The use of the place of incarceration to define felony resulted from a theory of 
punishment that divided criminal acts into those requiring reformation of the 
convict’s character and those lesser crimes that only required a sharp reminder to 
obey the law.  This division of crimes into those punished by prison and those 
punished by jail or fines came about through the work of legal and prison reformers, 
who convinced state legislatures to support their program of reform with new laws 
and new penal institutions. 
Within two decades of gaining independence from England, the states of the 
Union had replaced execution with incarceration as the punishment for all but a few 
crimes.47  This change was inspired by a belief that criminal behavior was the result 
not of some innate and unchangeable defect in the criminal but of poor upbringing 
and a corrupting social environment.48  What had been deformed by the delinquent’s 
past, however, could be reformed by a strictly regulated correctional environment.49 
Not only would such a program of reformation strengthen society by turning moral 
defectives into productive citizens, it would also “demonstrate the social blessings of 
republican political arrangements to the world . . .”50  
In 1786, Pennsylvania enacted a law51 that imposed imprisonment at hard labor 
for a specified list of crimes that had formerly been capital crimes; the term of 
imprisonment was “any term or time, at the discretion of the court . . . not exceeding 
ten years.”52  The change was not, however, universal since “every other felony or 
misdemeanor or offence whatsoever, not specifically provided for by this Act, may 
and shall be punished as heretofore.”53  And while the legislation contains some 
regulation of the conditions of confinement, it relies on the existing “Sheriffs or 
Keepers of the gaols . . . in the several counties . . .” to enforce those provisions.54 
A much more elaborate penal statute was enacted in 1794,55 expanding the list of 
crimes covered and providing sentence ranges for each crime (e.g., arson, five to 
twelve years in the penitentiary).56  For some more serious crimes, solitary 
confinement—from one-twentieth to one-half of the total sentence—could be 
                                                                
47
 6 DANE, supra note 24. 
48
 ORLANDO LEWIS, DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776-
1845, at 33 (1967) (“[I]t is from the ignorance, wretchedness and corrupted manners of a 
people that crimes proceed.” (quoting WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY HOW FAR THE 
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA 43 (Philadelphia, T. Dobson 1793))). 
49
 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE 




 Act of Sept. 15, 1786, ch. XLV, 10 PA. STAT. ANN. 128. 
52
 Id. § II. 
53
 Id. § X. 
54
 Id. § XVI. 
55
 Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. CCLVII, 18 PA. STAT. ANN. 599. 
56
 Id. §§ II-IX. 
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specified by the court.57  The 1794 Act also eliminated the death penalty in 
Pennsylvania for all crimes except first-degree murder.58  First degree murder was 
the only crime actually defined in the statute (murder with premeditation, or murder 
committed during the commission of, or attempts at arson, rape, robbery or 
burglary).59  Other crimes retained their common law definitions.  
A related movement to change the conditions of imprisonment gained 
momentum in 1787 with the foundation of the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating 
the Miseries of Public Prisons; among the founders were Benjamin Franklin and 
Benjamin Rush.60  They were inspired by the principles of the Quakers, notably 
William Penn,61 as well as English promoters of reform, such as John Howard and 
later, Jeremy Bentham.62   
The first fruit of their efforts at prison reform was the Walnut Street Prison in 
Philadelphia, which opened in 1790 with solitary “penitentiary” cells for serious 
offenders and larger common cells with associated workrooms for others.63  The Act 
authorizing the prison64 added several sections governing the construction and 
operation of new solitary cells.65  The facility soon became overcrowded, and 
additional penitentiaries were authorized in 1818 and 1821—without provision for 
group labor.66  The use of hard labor in solitary confinement cells for all serious 
offenders became known as the “Pennsylvania System.”67   
The penitentiary, however, was not the exclusive place of imprisonment in 
nineteenth-century Pennsylvania.  While the 1794 Act prescribed “confinement . . . 
to be had and performed in the . . . jail and penitentiary of Philadelphia,” an 1806 Act 
gave judges discretion in sentencing convicts to three years or less in the penitentiary 
or a county jail.68   
                                                                
57
 Id. § XI.  
58
 Id. § I. 
59
 Id. § II.  All other kinds of murder are second degree.  Id.  
60
 Harry Elmer Barnes, The Historical Origin of the Prison System in America, 12 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35, 45-48 (1921).  
61
 LEWIS, supra note 48, at 10-15. 
62
 John Howard, an indefatigable campaigner for prison reform, published the first edition 
of his STATE OF THE PRISONS in 1777, with a revised and expanded edition in 1784.  He was 
unsuccessful in his attempt to build England’s first penitentiary.  See EDGAR GIBSON, JOHN 
HOWARD 117-18 (1902).  Bentham’s PANOPTICON, A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TYPE OF PRISON—
along with two separate POSTSCRIPTS—was published in 1791.  
63
 LEWIS, supra note 48, at 25-37.  
64
 Act of Apr. 5, 1790, ch. 1516, 1790 Pa. Laws 511. 
65
 Id. at 515-23.  The motivation for instituting solitary confinement was expressed as: 
“[I]t is hoped that the addition of unremitted solitude to laborious employment as far as can be 
effected will contribute as much to reform as to deter.”  Id. at 511. 
66
 Barnes, supra note 60, at 48-49. 
67
 Id. at 49. 
68
 Act of Mar. 21, 1806, ch. 2649, 1806 Pa. Laws 239.  
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Other states, following Pennsylvania’s lead, enacted statutes that reformed penal 
laws and authorized new prison construction, usually in the same Act.  In 1796, the 
Virginia legislature directed the Governor to purchase land for a penitentiary and, in 
the same Act, substituted imprisonment for capital punishment for all crimes other 
than pre-meditated murder.69  Proponents cited the example of Pennsylvania, as well 
as principles of republican government, in support of the statute.70   
Also in 1796, New York State passed “[a]n Act making alterations in the 
criminal law of this State and for erecting State prisons,”71 which abolished forfeiture 
except for treason, prescribed incarceration rather than execution for all crimes other 
than treason or murder, and left it to the judge to decide between imprisonment at 
hard labor or in solitude, or both.72  Since the change in sentencing preceded the 
actual construction of a state prison, the Act provided that “the convict shall be 
confined to imprisonment in the gaol where such convict now is, until the State 
prisons . . . shall be ready. . . .”73  The prison constructed under the authority of this 
legislation (in an as yet undeveloped section of New York City) housed prisoners 
eight to a cell, with enforced solitude at meals and group labor at prison industries of 
various types.74  This system of enforced silence and prison industry—with the later 
amendment of solitary sleeping cells in cell blocks—became known as the “Auburn 
System” after the Auburn Prison in western New York State.75  The Pennsylvania 
System (labor in solitary confinement) and the Auburn System (silent, congregate 
labor with separate sleeping cells) were competing models for prisons in the United 
States through the mid-nineteenth century.76   
This revolution in the aims and means of punishment, motivated by a belief in the 
moral redemption of the criminal, changed the consequences of a criminal conviction 
but not the definitions of crimes.  Like other sentencing reform statutes of the period, 
the New York Act of 1796 prescribed sanctions for “felonies” without defining that 
term.77  That task fell to those who sought to organize and rationalize the law into 
codes.  
                                                                
69
 See Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary 
Virginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 76 (1983). 
70
 Id. at 78.  
71
 Act of Mar. 26, 1796, ch.30, 1796 N.Y. Laws 669.   
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. at 674-75.   In contrast, Massachusetts delayed implementation of sentencing reform 
until the opening of the State prison in 1805.  See Adam J. Hirsh, From Pillory to 
Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts,  80 MICH. L. REV. 
1179, 1250 (1982).  
74
 LEWIS, supra note 48, at 43-47. 
75
 Id. at 77-88.  
76
 Barnes, supra note 60, at 55-58. 
77
 Id. at 39-40. 
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2.  Codification 
A patch-work system of poorly organized and hard to locate statutes had created 
discontent with the legal system in post-Revolutionary America.  This discontent 
was strengthened by uncertainty as to which portions of the common law tradition 
had made the transition from pre- to post-Independence.  “It was . . . a time when 
statute law was, at best, inaccessible and the common law was often little better than 
slippery darkness.”78  
The problem of making statutes findable had been addressed with varying 
degrees of success since colonial times.79  The chosen solution was to reprint the 
session laws of the jurisdiction, usually in chronological order, with repealed and 
obsolete laws omitted.  Such a compilation was usually called a “revision” of the 
laws, a well-defined term in American law until the 1820s.80  Such compilations 
were, of course, out-of-date as of the next legislative session and had to be 
supplemented or republished at regular intervals.  Also, such collections did not 
include the common law applicable to the jurisdiction.81  
A more thoroughgoing approach was proposed by advocates of codification that, 
in the nineteenth century, meant an “ambitious undertaking to provide a complete 
and authoritative body of general principles covering most areas of human conduct 
arranged in logical order.”82  A model of such a code was available from antiquity in 
the Institutes of Justinian.83  A more contemporary European model was available in 
the civil and penal codes issued in France under Napoleon.84   
                                                                
78
 COOK, supra note 46, at 12 (1981).  
79
 See EDWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 73-82 (1990). 
80
 COOK, supra note 46, at 24.  Today there is no uniform practice in naming statutory 
compilations; the titles given to state enacted laws include, in addition to the popular “code”: 
“Revised Statutes” (Oregon, Missouri, Louisiana, Maine, Arizona, Kentucky), “Consolidated 
Statutes” (Pennsylvania, New York), “Compiled Statutes” (Illinois), “Compiled Laws” 
(Michigan), and “Revised Laws” (Nevada).  These various names are given to very similar 
works: subject arrangements of enacted laws of general application currently in force, with 
annotations to case law and commentary.  
81
 The four volumes of Pennsylvania laws edited by Alexander Dallas between 1793 and 
1801, however, did contain notes to court decisions that construed statutory language.  
SURRENCY, supra note 79, at 77.  For an attempt to clearly differentiate between a 
compilation, a revision, and a code, see L. Dee Mallonee, Revised Statutes and Codes, 48 AM. 
L. REV. 37, 37-38 (1914).  
82
 SURRENCY, supra note 79, at 82. 
83
 While many lawyers were classically educated, there was at least one English 
translation available since colonial times: THE FOUR BOOKS OF JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTIONS, 
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, WITH NOTES (George Harris trans., London, C. Barthurst & E. 
Withers 1756). 
84
 The civil code, promulgated in 1804, was available in English translation by 1811.  THE 
CODE NAPOLEON, VERBALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH (Bryant Barrett trans., London, 
W. Reed 1811); the penal code of 1810 was also available in English by 1811.  PENAL CODE 
OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE (London, J. McCreery 1811).  A review of the French codes published 
in the North American Review listed French editions of the civil and penal codes from 1809 
and 1812 respectively.  Code Napoleon, 20 N. AM. REV. 393 (1825).  
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Codification of the law also had a champion—the English philosopher and 
reformer, Jeremy Bentham, whose writings were widely read and discussed in the 
United States.85  Bentham’s goal for codification was to make the law “clear and 
simple enough for the ‘plain’ man to be capable of grasping it. . . . [and] made 
accessible to the citizen.”86  In his Principles of the Penal Code87 Bentham sought a 
logical order by categorizing crimes by the person or interest injured (public, private, 
one’s self) with further subdivisions within these categories.  This “scientific” 
organization of the law would replace the arbitrary and confusing system of the 
common law.88  Once such a code was established, Bentham insisted, nothing outside 
the code would be considered law; there would be no judge-made law even to 
interpret the code.89 
This radical antipathy to common law jurisprudence had several prominent 
proponents in the United States,90 but there were many more lawyers and judges 
committed to the common law tradition.  The high water mark for the radical 
reformers was Edward Livingston’s authorship of a Benthamite legal code for 
Louisiana that, however, was not enacted.91  
The codification movement bore less radical but more enduring fruit with the 
revision of statutory laws in a number of states, revisions on a more ambitious scale 
than the earlier chronological compilations.92  Most notable was the New York 
revision of 182993 that had national influence,94 especially in penal law.  At least one 
innovation of the New York revisors—the redefinition of felony—had long lasting 
repercussions.  
III.  THE DEFINING MOMENT 
Those who took up the task of recasting or replacing the mix of patchwork 
statutes and common law crimes with a systemized penal code faced questions not 
only about which crimes should be punished and how.  They also needed to define 
terms that were ambiguous in the common law, such as “infamous crime” or 
                                                                
85
 See George M. Hezel, The Influence of Bentham’s Philosophy of Law on the Early 
Nineteenth Century Codification Movement in the United States, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 253 (1972); 
Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1098 (1978).  
86
 Terry DiFilippo, Jeremy Bentham’s Codification Proposals and Some Remarks on Their 
Place in History, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 239, 242 (1972).  
87
 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Penal Code, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION  239, 
240-41 (C.K. Odgen ed., 1931). 
88
 Hezel, supra note 85, at 256.  
89
 COOK, supra note 46, at 77.  
90
 See Maxwell Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codifiers: The Roots of American 
Legal Reform, 1820-1830,11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 234 (1967); Hezel, supra note 85. 
91
 See infra Part II.B. 
92
 See SURRENCY, supra note 79, at 84-85. 
93
 Id. at 86. 
94
 See COOK, supra note 46, at 167-68. 
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“felony.”  The definition of “infamous crimes” was complicated by the use of the 
term in its popular (“infamous punishment”) sense in the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal Constitution.95  In the case of “felonies,” they needed to decide if the 
felony/misdemeanor classification should be retained, and if retained, how defined.  
If they accepted Blackstone’s assertion that the “true criterion of felony is 
forfeiture,”96 then the term was essentially meaningless in American law since, as 
Dane97 pointed out, by the 1820s, forfeiture subsequent to conviction had virtually 
disappeared in the United States98 with public opinion condemning forfeiture as 
being “an unnecessary and hard punishment of the felon’s posterity.”99  
If, on Blackstone’s other hand, they chose to equate felony with capital 
punishment, they needed to reconcile this not only with the diminishing use of the 
death penalty in the United States at that time,100 but also the growing movement to 
abolish capital punishment altogether.  Although associated—at least initially—with 
the Quakers,101 the movement attracted, among others, the most prominent of the 
codifiers, Edward Livingston, whose proposed criminal code for Louisiana abolished 
the death penalty and was preceded in 1822 by a denunciation of capital 
punishment102 that was widely circulated and reviewed.103 
Livingston’s solution to the problem of defining felony was to jettison the term 
entirely.  A different—and ultimately more influential—approach, taken by the 
Committee to Revise the Laws of New York, was to redefine the term to include 
both capital crimes and those punished by terms in the penitentiary.104  The New 
                                                                
95
 “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The federal courts 
in the early Republic interpreted this language in light of the common law regarding the 
exclusion of witnesses—up until the 1885 Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Wilson, 114 
U.S. 417 (1885).  See Reuben Oppenheimer, Infamous Crimes and the Moreland Case, 36 
HARV. L. REV. 299, 301 (1923).  
96
 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18. 
97
 6 DANE, supra note 24. 
98
 However, forfeiture was not ancient.  New York, for instance, had confirmed forfeiture 
for crimes in 1788, 1788 N.Y. Laws 666, only to bar it—except for treason—in 1796, 1796 
N.Y. Laws 670.  Other types of forfeiture, including in rem forfeiture of specific property, 
remained in effect.  See James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at 
Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 779 (1977).  
99
 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 317 (New York, O. Halsted 1827). 
100
 See 6 DANE, supra note 24. 
101
 David Brion Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-
1861, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23, 28 (1957). 
102
 See 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 
35-59 (New York, Patterson Smith 1873) [hereinafter 1 COMPLETE WORKS]. 
103
 Lengthy reviews of the 1822 report appeared in the United States Law Journal, Penal 
Jurisprudence, 1 U.S. L.J. 259, 259-80 (1823), and the North American Review, Punishment of 
Crimes, 10 N. AM. REV. 235, 235-59 (1823).  
104
 See infra Part II.C. 
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York approach was widely influential due to its adoption by the newly formed states 
in the West.105 
Another solution was to retain some version of the common law definition 
adapted to American circumstances, resisting the movement to codify the criminal 
law.  Maryland, firmly in the common law camp, followed this path.  
A.  Persistence of the Common Law: Maryland 
Codification was not universally viewed as beneficial or even necessary, 
especially among the common law-trained lawyers.106 Resistance to the calls for 
legal reform was one way of responding to them and would produce a different result 
from those jurisdictions that embraced reform.  Maryland was one state where the 
winds of change blew lightly in the early 1800s.  Colonial Maryland’s proprietary 
form of government had led to an impasse between the Lord Proprietor and the 
legislature, and this limited the amount of legislation passed in colonial times.  This 
situation left the development of felony law to the courts of the Colony.107  Maryland 
did pass an act to set penalties for crimes in 1809.108  As in other states, the act 
included instructions for the operation of the state penitentiary, which was then still 
under construction.109  The criminal sentences portion of the Act was modeled on the 
Pennsylvania Act of 1794,110 but it retained capital punishment as the sole 
punishment for two crimes: “first-degree murder,” and instigation of a slave revolt.111  
The terms “felon” and “feloniously” were used in passing, but without definition.  
Maryland resisted systematic codification until 1860112 when the state enacted its 
first subject arrangement of laws, repealing all former legislation.113  The 1860 Code 
                                                                
105
 See infra Part II.D. 
106
 See COOK, supra note 46, at 103-05. 
107
 See BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660, at 17 
(1983). 
108
 1809 Md. Laws ch. 138.  The prison regimen resembles the early stages of the 
Pennsylvania system: solitary hard labor.  Id. § 30. 
109
 Id.  
110
 Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 257, 18 PA. STAT. ANN. 599. 
111
 1809 Md. Laws ch. 138, §§ 2, 4.  This was included under the larger division of high 
treason, which could be punished either by death or imprisonment for six to twenty years.  
112
 Maryland was not, however, the last of the original thirteen states to adopt a 
comprehensive code of laws.  Pennsylvania, because of a constitutional impediment, did not 
adopt an official code until 1972.  Purdon’s Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, which served as 
the state code, was entirely a commercial enterprise with organization and numbering supplied 
by the publisher.  See Charles W. Rubendall II, The Constitution and the Consolidated 
Statutes, 80 DICK. L. REV. 118, 118-19 (1975).   
113
 2 THE MARYLAND CODE, PUBLIC GENERAL AND PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS (Baltimore, John 
Murphy & Co. 1860).  In The Maryland Code, articles, and subjects within articles, were 
arranged in alphabetical order.  Five sets of revised statutes, with statutes in chronological 
order, had been issued since colonial times, but without any effort at systemization.  See THE 
LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND (Philadelphia, Andrew Bradford 1718); LAWS OF 
MARYLAND AT LARGE, WITH PROPER INDEXES (Thomas Bacon ed., Annapolis, Jonas Green 
1765); 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND (William Kilty ed., Frederick Green.1799-1800); 5 THE 
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listed crimes alphabetically, but with no section on definitions, leaving in place the 
common law definitions.114  Section 181, “Sentence,” provides a catch-all sentence 
range of eighteen months to five years for felonies not otherwise covered in the 
Code, but no list or definition for felony was provided.115 
A definition for felony was developed in Maryland—over time—by the courts.  
The cases arose from indictments that charged defendants with committing a crime 
“feloniously” when that crime was not a common law felony (i.e., not arson), nor 
explicitly made a felony by statute.  In State v. Black,116 the court reversed a 
conviction for burning a haystack (a statutory crime under the 1809 Act, which 
describes the crime as “willfully burning . . . any stack . . . of hay . . . .”).117.  The 
indictment, however, stated that the act was done “feloniously, unlawfully, willfully 
and maliciously.”118  In reversing, the court held that “neither at the common law, nor 
by the act of 1809 . . . is the act of burning a stack of hay a felony.”119 
The opinion in Black omits any mention of the sentence prescribed by the 1809 
Act for burning a haystack: either death or imprisonment in the penitentiary for three 
to twelve years,120 making the crime—at the court’s discretion—a capital one.  A 
later court dealing with substantially the same statutory language in the 1878 
Revised Code 121 relied on Black to hold that when the “punishment of death is in the 
discretion of the Court . . . such offences [sic] are misdemeanors.”122 
Maryland’s definition of felony was given its mature form in Dutton v. State,123 a 
case involving a death sentence for attempted rape, where the defendant had not been 
arraigned.  The Court held that an attempted felony was a misdemeanor (and not an 
infamous crime requiring arraignment) despite the possible sentence, writing:  
The distinction made in some jurisdictions that crimes punishable by 
death or confinement in the penitentiary are felonies, and others 
misdemeanors has never existed in this State, but here only those are 
felonies which were such at common law, or have been so declared by 
statute.  The fact that a crime is punishable in the penitentiary or is 
“infamous” does not make it a felony in this State.124   
                                                          
LAWS OF MARYLAND (Thomas Harris, William Kilty, & John N. Watkins eds., Annapolis, 
Jonas Green 1820); 3 THE GENERAL PUBLIC STATUTORY LAW AND PUBLIC LOCAL LAW OF THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND (Clement Dorsey ed., Baltimore, Toy 1840).   
114
 2 MARYLAND CODE, supra note 113. 
115
 1809 Md. Laws, ch. 138, § 11. 
116
 State v. Black,  2 Md. 376, 380 (Md. 1852).  
117
 1809 Md. Laws, ch. 138, § 5.  
118
 Black, 2 Md. at 378-79. 
119
 Id. at 379.  
120
 1809 Md. Laws, ch. 138, § 5. 
121
 MD. CODE ANN., GEN. LAWS art. 72, § 33 (West 1878). 
122
 Gibson v. State, 54 Md. 447, 453 (Md. 1880) (alteration in original).  
123
 Dutton, 91 A. at 417. 
124
 Id. at 419-20 (emphasis added). 
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This formulation is quite similar to that in Wharton’s 1846 Treatise on the Criminal 
Law.125  The explicit divorce of the felony designation from the sentence, however, 
was an innovation, as was the recognition of (potentially) capital misdemeanors.  
Maryland remains a common law state, with statutes in many instances prescribing 
penalties while leaving the definition of the crime to the courts.126  The definition of 
felony is still the one developed over time by the courts using the common law 
method.  In other parts of the country, however, reformers sought faster and more 
thoroughgoing changes. 
B.  A Benthamite on the Bayou: Livingston’s Penal Code 
Edward Livingston lived an interesting life.127  A practicing lawyer in New York 
City, he served three terms as a U.S. Congressman representing New York.128  
Subsequently, he was simultaneously Mayor of New York City and the U.S. District 
Attorney for New York.129  When a subordinate stole customs revenues, Livingston 
took on the losses as a personal debt, then set off for New Orleans—which had only 
been recently acquired from the French—to rebuild his fortune.130  During the War of 
1812, he obtained amnesty for the pirate, Jean Lafitte, and befriended General 
Andrew Jackson.131  He served in the Louisiana legislature (where he was selected to 
author a penal code), then was elected to the U.S. Congress—this time from 
Louisiana.132  He was Jackson’s Secretary of State, and later, his ambassador to 
France.133   
Livingston’s great and lasting fame came from his authorship of a penal code for 
Louisiana, even though it was never enacted in that state.134 
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 WHARTON, supra note 20. 
126
 CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., CRIMINAL HOMICIDE LAW 31 (2002).  
127
 A brief account of his life can be found in A. E. Wilkinson, Edward Livingston and the 
Penal Codes, 1 TEX. L. REV. 25, 25-37 (1922).  Two book-length biographies have been 
published: CHARLES HAVENS HUNT, LIFE OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON 1 (1864), and WILLIAM B. 
HATCHER, EDWARD LIVINGSTON: JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRAT 1 
(1940).  Greater detail on his work on the Penal Code can be found in Ginger Roberts, Edward 
Livingston and American Penology, 37 LA. L. REV. 1037 (1977).  His papers are archived at 
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Livingston Papers, http://diglib.princeton.edu/ead/getEad?eadid=C0280&kw= (last visited 
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 Wilkinson, supra note 127, at 28. 
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 Id. at 28-29. 
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 Id. at 31-32. 
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 Id. at 34, 36. 
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 Id. at 35.  
134
 Acclaim came from both within the United States and abroad.  Jeremy Bentham 
reciprocated Livingston’s great esteem.  Roberts, supra note 127, at 1055.  Thomas Jefferson 
wrote that Livingston’s name would join those of the great “sages of antiquity.”  Letter to 
Edward Livingston (Mar. 25, 1825), in 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112, 113 (Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial Ass’n ed., 1903).  The adulation was not universal.  Livingston, while 
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Prior to its acquisition by the Unites States, Louisiana had been governed by the 
civil law traditions of France and Spain.  Despite an influx of common-law lawyers 
after annexation, the territory managed to retain its civil law tradition and enact the 
Digest of Civil Law modeled on the Code Napoleon of 1806.135  Criminal law, 
however, was governed by a territorial act passed in 1805 that incorporated the 
English common law of crimes.136  
Although Livingston had been trained in the common law tradition, when he was 
entrusted by the Louisiana legislature with drafting a penal code, he turned to the 
principles of Jeremy Bentham137 and the example of the 1810 French penal code138 
for guidance.  While he corresponded widely in preparing his Code,139 Livingston 
worked alone in writing it.140  
The product of this effort was a complete system of laws organized into separate 
codes on crimes and punishments, criminal procedure, evidence (applicable to both 
criminal and civil trials), and corrections.  A “book” of definitions was appended to 
define technical terms used in the several codes.141  The organization of offenses in 
the Code of Crimes and Punishments was by interest or person affected (e.g., 
                                                          
Secretary of State, was the target of an especially lurid bit of political vituperation: “[H]e is a 
man of splendid abilities, but utterly corrupt.  He shines and stinks like rotten mackerel by 
moonlight.”  WILLIAM CABELL BRUCE, 2 JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 1773-1883, at 197 
(1922).   
135
 Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 407, 419-21 (1996).  
136
 Act of May 4, 1805, Acts Passed at the First Session of the Legislative Council of the 
Territory of Orleans, ch. 50, § 33.  No definition of felony was provided in this act, but the 
term was translated into French (all acts were printed in facing page translations) as “crime 
capital.”  Id. § 28.  
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 See Kadish, supra note 85, at 1101.  For other intellectual influences on Livingston’s 
work see Gail McKnight Beckman, Three Penal Codes Compared, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
148, 161-62 (1966). 
138
 The influence of the French code is reflected in the organization of Livingston’s Code 
of Crimes and Punishments with its introductory sections on persons subject to the code, and a 
general discussion of punishments, as well as the use of continuously numbered sections 
throughout.  The division of crimes under the Code Pénal was: delits (misdemeanors) 
punishable by simple imprisonment for 6 days to 5 years, and crimes, punishable by death, 
deportation, imprisonment at hard labor, loss of civil status, or the pillory.  Code Pénal de 
1810, http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_legislation_criminelle/anciens_textes/code_penal_de_ 
1810.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2009).  
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 Livingston mentions a few of his correspondents in his 1822 Report to the legislature.  
1 COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 102, at 8.  A more extensive list can be seen in the hand list 
of letters under the rubric “Papers Relating to the Penal Code, Criminal Jurisprudence, and 
Related Topics” at the Princeton archive site.  Edward Livingson Papers, supra note 127. 
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 After spending two years completing a full version of the Code, Livingston lost the 
entire work product in a fire; it took another two years to recreate the Code.  See Wilkinson, 
supra note 127, at 36. 
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 The list of definitions integrated into the code seems to be Livingston’s innovation; this 
at least was his opinion.  EDWARD LIVINGSTON, Introductory Report to the Code of Crimes and 
Punishments, in 1 COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 102, at 228. 
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Offences against the sovereign power of the state—Title II, or Title XX—Offences 
against individuals in their profession or trade), similar to the French code.142   
Livingston used the term “offence” to mean an act forbidden by the penal code.143  
Each offense was treated in a separate section containing a definition of the offense 
and a prescribed punishment.144  He recognized a distinction between offenses: 
“crimes”—punishable by imprisonment plus solitary hard labor or loss of civil 
rights—and “misdemeanors” that were offenses punishable by simple imprisonment 
and fines.145  If loss of a civil right was included in the penalty, the code specifies 
either a period of suspension or total forfeiture.146  One right that was not forfeitable 
was that of testifying, since “such a disqualification would be a most serious 
punishment to persons whose property, reputation, or life, might depend on the 
testimony of the person disqualified, but could be none to him.”147  The “infamous 
crimes” of the common law had no place in Livingston’s plan, and the term is not 
used. 
The distinction between crimes and misdemeanors plays little role in the Code of 
Crimes and Punishments; there it was only used to distinguish between those 
offenses which must be prosecuted by indictment (crimes) and those lesser offenses 
which can be prosecuted by information.148  The difference becomes crucial in the 
Code of Reform and Prison Discipline.  Here, misdemeanors are punished in a House 
of Detention that allows communication between prisoners, and “the imprisonment is 
intended more for punishment than reformation.”149  Crimes, on the other hand, 
“suppose in the offender a depravity and corruption of mind which requires the 
application of reformatory discipline as well as punishment.”150  Reformation of the 
inmate’s character seems to have required a term of at least one year; sentences in 
the code vary from one year to life for imprisonment in the penitentiary.  “Simple 
imprisonment” in the House of Detention, on the other hand, could be anything from 
ten days (unauthorized opening of a sealed letter)151 to two years (abducting a female 
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18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/4
2009] UNINTENDED COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 479 
for an unwelcome marriage).152  Ultimately, it was the place and manner of 
incarceration that was important, not the length of the sentence. 
Livingston’s system of penal laws was built from first principles, rather than 
revising and systemizing existing laws.153  It was a code in the Benthamite sense, 
comprising all the law in a unified format with no room for judge-made law: 
Courts are expressly prohibited from punishing any acts or omissions 
which are not forbidden by the plain import of the words of the law, under 
the pretence that they are within its spirit.  It is better that acts of an evil 
tendency should for a time be done with impunity, than that courts should 
assume legislative powers . . . .154 
There was no place in his code for court-made law, and none for “fogs and 
fictions.”  The word felony does not appear in the Code of Crimes and Punishments, 
nor in the Book of Definitions.155  Both of Blackstone’s definitions (forfeiture or 
capital crime) are inapplicable to Livingston’s code, since neither forfeiture nor 
capital punishments are authorized.156  And, the use of a common law term with all 
its history and case law development would have been antithetical to Livingston’s 
goal of creating a purely legislative system of laws.  
Livingston presented the complete code to the Louisiana legislature in 1825.157  
Having been elected to the U.S. Congress by this time, he was unable to work for 
enactment in person.  His insistence on abolishing the death penalty probably 
doomed passage in any event.  The code, although widely discussed and acclaimed, 
was never enacted.158  One place that it received particular attention was New York 
state. 
C.  A Committee of Young Men: New York Revised Statutes of 1829 
In 1824, the New York legislature decided it was time for a revision of the state’s 
statutes along the lines of the previous revisions done in 1801 and 1813—“mere 
compilations of existing statutes in chronological order.”159  After some initial 
turnover in the group of revisors, the project of revision was finally placed in the 
hands of three lawyer-politicians from western and up-state New York: Benjamin F. 
                                                                
152
 Id. art. 459, at 122. 
153
 Livingston felt free to invent entirely new areas of law, such as making it a crime to 
interfere with freedom of the press.  Id. art. 239, at 69.  Enhanced penalties were imposed if 
done by a public official to avoid exposure.  Id. art. 240, at 69-70. 
154
 Id. art. 8, at 15. 
155
 See generally id. 
156
 For Livingston’s full argument against the death penalty see 1 COMPLETE WORKS, 
supra note 102, at 190-240. 
157
 Wilkinson, supra note 127, at 34, 36.  
158
 Except, apparently, in Guatemala.  Id. at 37. 
159
 SURRENCY, supra note 79, at 86.  One of the men initially named to the task, ex-
Chancellor James Kent had, in fact, worked on the 1801 revision.  WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, 
THE REVISION OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE REVISERS 6-9 (New 
York, Banks & Bros. 1889).  Kent, however, declined the appointment.  Id. at 7.  
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Butler,160 John Duer,161 and—somewhat later—John C. Spencer.162  They were from 
the same milieu as Edward Livingston163 but almost a full generation younger.   
Confronted with the assigned task of updating a patchwork of uncoordinated 
statutes, Duer and Butler decided that the time was right to create a more rational and 
organized body of statutory law “by adopting a new and more scientific method.”164  
Their plan, presented to the legislature in 1825, proposed to “‘reduce all acts relating 
to the same subject, into one, . . . render[ing] the statutes more concise, perspicuous, 
and intelligible’” with the “‘whole written law [arranged logically] under appropriate 
titles . . . .’”165  The revisors were successful in persuading the legislature to expand 
the original mandate to accomplish those goals,166 and the code was fully 
completed—and previous statutes repealed—in December 1828.167 This 
reorganization and rewriting of the existing statutory law would be called The 
Revised Statutes of the State of New-York.  Despite the name, it was clearly a code in 
the modern, if not the Benthamite, sense of the word.  The criminal law portion of 
                                                                
160
 Butler was born in 1795 in Columbia County, New York.  2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 356 (Alan Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1958).  After a “scanty” education in a 
local school, he studied law and became a partner in the firm of Martin Van Buren.  Id.  He 
was District Attorney for Albany County when appointed a revisor.  Id.  He was later a state 
legislator and Attorney General under Andrew Jackson.  Id.  
161
 Duer was born in Albany, New York.  3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 485 
(Alan Johnson & Dumas Malone eds. 1959).  Despite an “intermittent and scanty” education, 
he studied law in the office of Alexander Hamilton, then practiced law in Orange County, 
New York, before being elected to the state constitutional convention in 1821.  Id. at 485-86. 
The abilities he displayed at the convention led to his appointment as a revisor.  Id. at 486.  He 
was later a U.S. District Attorney and judge in New York City.  Id. 
162
 Spencer was born in 1788 in Hudson, New York. 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 449 (Dumas Malone ed., 1964).  The best educated of the revisors, he attended the 
recently established Union College in Schenectady, New York, then studied law in Albany 
while working as secretary to the governor of the state.  Id.  He opened a practice in the (then) 
frontier region of Ontario County, New York, where he held a number of political offices 
culminating in one term in the U.S. House of Representatives, then several terms in the state 
legislature, where he was appointed as a revisor.  Id.  He later served as Secretary of State for 
New York State and served as Secretary War and Secretary of the Treasury under President 
John Tyler.  Id. at 450.  
163
 Livingston was born in 1764 in Columbia County, New York, and then schooled in 
Albany before attending the College of New Jersey (Princeton) in 1799.  6 DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 309 (Dumas Malone ed., 1961).  Duer and Livingston were well 
acquainted; Duer’s older brother, William, was in practice with Livingston in New York City 
and later followed him to New Orleans.  3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 
161, at 488.  
164
 Introduction to APPENDIX, CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE 
REVISERS, in 3 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 403, 403 (Albany, 
Packard & Van Benthuysen 1836). 
165
 Id. at 404 (quoting Letter from John Duer & Benjamin F. Butler to Samuel J. Wilkin, 
Chairman (Feb. 4, 1825)).  
166
 Id. at 408-10.  
167
 Id. at 420. 
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the code was organized primarily by type of punishment, with non-capital felonies 
subdivided by interest affected:  
Title 1.—Of crimes punishable with death. 
Title 2.—Of offences against the person, punishable by imprisonment in a 
state prison. 
Title 3.—Of offences against property, punishable by imprisonment in a 
state prison. 
Title 4.—Of offences affecting the administration of justice, punishable 
by imprisonment in a state prison. 
Title 5.—Of offences against the public peace and public morals, and 
other miscellaneous offences, punishable by imprisonment in a state 
prison.168 
It was not, like Livingston’s penal code, written from first principles.169  In 
writing the criminal law portion of their code, the New York revisors found 
Livingston’s work useful, “[b]ut the different state of society, for which our labors 
are intended . . . have prevented the adoption of many provisions suggested by 
[Livingston].”170  Despite the extensive reorganization and editing—and in some 
instances “rounding out” of existing provisions—the Revised Statutes of 1829 was 
described as a reworking of existing statute law.171  Even more importantly 
politically, the code did not attempt to supplant the common law, a prospect against 
which “the whole body of the [legal] profession was arrayed.”172  Most of the titles 
and subdivisions in their criminal laws were, in fact, taken from Blackstone,173 
                                                                
168
 AN ACT CONCERNING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS; PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES; 
AND PRISON DISCIPLINE, in 2 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, pt. II, ch. 
VII, 655 (Albany, Packard & Van Benthuysen 1829).  
169
 The following illustrates this difference in approach: Livingston defines, elucidates, 
and parses the meaning of the crime of robbery through nine sections of his code (about a 
page) including language that “[t]he audacity of an open infringement of the laws, and the 
alarm and danger it creates, are the characteristics of this species of theft.”  2 COMPLETE 
WORKS, supra note 142, at 176.  The New York code devotes one section to first degree 
robbery (fear of immediate injury), and another to second degree robbery (threat of future 
injury); the stilted language of both sections was copied from prior statutes.  AN ACT 
CONCERNING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, pt. IV, ch. I, tit. 3, art. 5, §§ 55-56, supra note 168, at 
677.  The use of common law antecedents and prior statutory language throughout the New 
York code reduced the need for lengthy explanations. 
170
 Introduction to APPENDIX, CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE 
REVISERS, supra note 164, at 420. 
171
 John T. Fitzpatrick, The Revised Statutes of New York, 19 LAW LIBR. J. 72, 77 (1926). 
172
 BUTLER, supra note 159, at 21. 
173
 Introduction to APPENDIX, CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE 
REVISERS, supra note 164, at 417.  
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making the project more acceptable to common law jurists and lawyers.174 This 
compromise between radical reform and common law conservatism managed—at 
least partially—to satisfy both camps, while establishing a model for the rest of the 
nation.175  
The revisors’ amalgamation of old statutory language, common law principles 
and innovation is reflected in their treatment of felony.  Title 7 of the Code’s chapter 
on criminal law is entitled General provisions concerning crimes and their 
punishment; sections 30 through 35 are devoted to definitions.  Section 30 reads: 
The term “felony,” when used in this act, or in any other statute, shall be 
construed to mean an offence for which the offender, on conviction, shall 
be liable by law to be punished by death, or by imprisonment in a state 
prison.176 
It might be supposed that the revisors had a source for this definition somewhere in 
New York statutory or case law, but the Reports of the Revisers state otherwise:   
The term felony originally imported an offence for which the offender 
forfeited his fief, his lands and tenements, goods and chattels.  Such 
forfeitures have long been abolished, and the term has really no 
signification in our law.  It is frequently used in statutes, and it is therefore 
desirable to give it a definite meaning. The definition proposed is 
conformable to the common understanding.177  
They retained the term because—conservatively—they wished to avoid too much 
rewriting of existing statutes.  On the other hand, they felt free to create a definition 
because one was lacking.  Their appeal to “common understanding” is unconvincing, 
at least if they meant common among the legal community.  Wharton’s definition of 
classic plus statutory felonies178 would have been the most likely candidate for a 
“common understanding” at the time, and the courts of New York still looked to 
English common law to define felony.179  It is probable, though unstated, that by 
                                                                
174
 Their retention of the death penalty for some crimes likely had the same motive.  
175
 COOK, supra note 46, at 167-69. 
176
 AN ACT CONCERNING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT, pt. IV, ch. I, tit. 7, § 30, supra note 
168, at 702. 
177
 APPENDIX, CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE REVISERS, in 3 
THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 421, 836-37 (Albany, Packard & Van 
Benthuysen 1836) (citations omitted). 
178
 See WHARTON, supra note 20. 
179
 In a charge to the jury in 1820, Cadwallader Colden, then mayor of New York City, 
stated “we cannot ascertain what constitutes a felony or a larceny without appealing to the 
common law of England.”  WILLIAM SAMPSON, TRIAL OF ROBERT M. GOODWIN 169 (New-
York, G.L. Birch & Co. 1820).  Colden, born in 1769, was well educated and an experienced 
lawyer and politician; he served in both the state legislature and the U.S. Congress.  
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 806 (Joint Committee on 
Printing ed., 1989), available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index 
=C000604.  The mayor sitting as judge of a trial court was a peculiarity of New York law 
derived from both medieval English and Dutch antecedents.  See SELECT CASES OF THE 
MAYOR’S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784, at 45–51 (Richard B. Morris ed. 1935).  
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“common understanding” they meant Blackstone’s alternate definition for felony: a 
crime punishable by death.  But, since capital punishment was much less frequently 
employed than in Blackstone’s day, they added “or imprisonment in the state prison” 
to cover all serious crimes, those crimes which evidenced the moral corruption that a 
period of reformation in the penitentiary regime was designed to correct.180   
By rejecting the formal common law definition of felony (forfeiture), and 
adapting the informal one (capital punishment) to the state of the law in the early 
Republic, the revisors created a new American definition of felony that found 
widespread acceptance throughout the country. 
In another striking example of this method of adapting common law concepts to 
American circumstances, “infamous crime” was given virtually the same definition 
as “felony” in section 31 of the 1829 Code:   
Whenever the term “infamous crime,” is used in any statute, it shall be 
construed as including every offence punishable with death or by 
imprisonment in a state prison, and no other.181  
Here, the revisors chose to define the term in its constitutional rather than its 
evidentiary sense, and they used the popular (“infamous punishment”) meaning of 
the term, rather than the formal common law one (“witness disqualification”).182  
Since all of the infamous punishments listed by Kent,183 except death and 
imprisonment, had been abandoned in New York by that time, these remaining two 
became the punishments that defined “infamous crimes” in the 1829 Code.  National 
acceptance was slower for this definition than for that of felony.  When, in 1885, the 
Supreme Court decided Ex parte Wilson184 and merged the definitions of “felony” 
and “infamous crimes” (imprisonment at hard labor) for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court noted that it was common practice in the lower courts to 
                                                          
Edward Livingston presided while mayor and had published judicial opinions.  JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE MAYOR’S COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK IN THE YEAR 1802, at 
7 (D. Longworth 1980) (1803). 
180
 See, e.g., AN ACT CONCERNING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS pt. IV, ch. I, tit. 7, § 30, § 31 
supra note 168, at 702. 
181
 AN ACT CONCERNING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT, pt. IV, ch. I, tit. 7, § 31, supra note 
168, at 702.   
182
 Felons were, in fact, disqualified as witnesses under the Revised Statutes, but the 
statute uses conviction of a felony rather than of an infamous crime as the disqualifying event.  
AN ACT CONCERNING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT, pt. IV, ch. I, tit. 7, §23, supra note 168, at 
701.  This language, however, was added by the legislature.  The revisors had originally 
restricted disqualifying crimes to perjury and subornation of perjury; in the revisors notes they 
echo Livingston’s argument that excluding the testimony punishes the party seeking to 
introduce the testimony, not the witness.  APPENDIX, CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE 
ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE REVISERS, pt. IV, ch. I, supra note 164, at 835-36. 
183
 Death, gallows, pillory, branding, whipping, confinement to hard labor, and ear 
cropping.  DANE, supra note 41. 
184
 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).  Acting on a habeas corpus petition from a 
prisoner who had been convicted on the basis of an informant (not a grand jury indictment), 
and sentenced to 15 years at hard labor, the Court held that “a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime.”  Id. at 429.   
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interpret the Constitution’s “infamous crime” to mean crimes that would disqualify 
the convict to be a witness.185  
Another feature of the 1829 Code that was to have an impact on the future 
development of the concept of felony was the clear divide between the length of 
sentences for felonies and misdemeanors.  Because jails lacked the reformative 
programs of the state prisons, the revisors stipulated that no imprisonment in a 
county jail would exceed one year.186  This made a sentence of more than one year 
and a sentence of incarceration in the penitentiary equivalent—an automatic felony 
sentence.  Eventually, some jurisdictions used the “more than one year” length of 
sentence instead of the place of incarceration to define felony, and this became the 
definition used in the Model Penal Code.187  
The definitions of crimes in the Revised Statutes of 1829 were carried forward 
into New York’s Field Codes in the 1860s and on into the twentieth century.188  New 
York retained the 1829 definition of felony in its penal code until 1965, when a new 
code strongly influenced by the Model Penal Code was enacted, and felony was 
redefined by length of sentence (more than one year) rather than by place of 
incarceration.189  The influence of the revisors’ work extended far beyond New York.  
“As the newer states were admitted to the Union many of them adopted the New 
York Revised Statutes with but minor changes to suit local conditions; others 
adopted great parts of them verbatim.”190  Over time, most United States jurisdictions 
used either the place of incarceration or its derivative, the length of sentence, to 
define felony. 
D.  How the West Was Won 
In 1857, Francis Wharton wrote in his Treatise on the Criminal Law:  
In this country, with a few exceptions, the common law classification has 
obtained; the principal felonies being received as they originally existed, 
and their number being increased as the exigencies of society prompted.  
In New York, however, felony, by the revised statutes, is construed to 
mean an offence for which the offender, upon conviction, shall be liable 
by law to be punished by death, or by imprisonment in a state prison.191  
                                                                
185
 Id. at 425. 
186
 APPENDIX, CONTAINING EXTRACTS FROM THE ORIGINAL REPORTS OF THE REVISERS, pt. 
IV, ch. I, supra note 164, at 807.  
187
 See Part E infra. 
188
 N.Y. PENAL CODE § 5 (1865); see also id. § 3 at 3; John W. Mac Donald, The 
Classification of Crimes, 18 CORNELL L. Q. 524, 524-36 (1932-1933).  David Dudley Field, 
the eponymous champion of New York’s Field Codes, was inspired by Livingston’s work but 
shared the pragmatism of the 1829 revisors.  Beckman, supra note 137, at 168.   
189
 Act of July 20, 1965, ch. 1030, 1965 NEW YORK LAWS 2347.  On the influence of the 
Model Penal Code on the 1965 code see Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1964). 
190
 Fitzpatrick, supra note 171, at 78. 
191
 FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 112 (4th 
ed. Philadelphia, Kay & Bro. 1857).  
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One hundred years later, the comparable text in Wharton’s Criminal Law read:   
In many states the distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor 
generally is whether the defendant may be imprisoned in the state 
penitentiary or executed on the one hand, or whether he may be only 
fined.  In the former case the offense is a felony, while in the latter it is 
merely a misdemeanor.192  
The New York definition had become the norm.  The convenience of enacting a 
code wholesale, along with the prestige of New York’s legal tradition, made 
adoption of the Revised Statutes an easy solution for new states with an urgent need 
for laws, and little in the way of legal tradition to draw on.193 Often the process of 
dividing territories into states sped up the adoption of New York-modeled laws: 
Michigan enacted a code based on the Revised Statutes; Wisconsin’s laws were 
based on those of Michigan; those of Minnesota were based on those of 
Wisconsin.194  The adoption of New York’s Field codes in California and other 
western states spread the felony definition originally developed for the 1829 code 
even farther.195  
Ohio, in an excess of patriotic fervor, had abrogated the English common law in 
1806,196 despite the absence of a body of statute law to take its place.197 When a 
comprehensive statute on major crimes was enacted in 1815,198  the word “felony” 
did not appear anywhere in the act; offenses were divided into crimes, 
misdemeanors, and high misdemeanors.199  The prescribed punishment for all crimes, 
including misdemeanors, was imprisonment in the penitentiary at hard labor, with 
                                                                
192
 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 58 (1957).  
193




 California’s penal code of 1872 was modeled on a draft of the New York code prepared 
by David Dudley Field and others.  Rosamond Parma, History of the Adoption of the Codes of 
California, 22 LAW LIBR. J. 8, 19 (1929).  As amended in 1874, Section 17 of the Penal Code 
read:  
A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the State 
Prison. . . . When a crime, punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison, is also 
punishable by fine or imprisonment in a County Jail, in the discretion of the Court, it 
shall be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes after a judgment imposing a 
punishment other than imprisonment in the State Prison.  
ACTS AMENDATORY OF THE PENAL CODES PASSED AT THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE 
LEGISLATURE, ch. 196, 455 (1873-74).  The broad discretion given to the courts by the 
additional “also punishable” provision—creating so-called “wobbler” crimes—remains a 
source of controversy to this day.  See Loren Gordon, Where to Commit a Crime if You Can 
Only Spare a Few Days to Serve the Crime: The Constitutionality of California’s Wobbler 
Statutes as Applied in the State Today, 33 SW.U. L. REV. 497 (2004). 
196
 Act of Jan. 2, 1806, 1806 Ohio Laws 38.   
197
 David A. Johnston, Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm’n, PROPOSED OHIO CRIMINAL CODE 
24 (1971).  
198
 Act of Jan. 27, 1815, ch. 28, 1815 Ohio Laws 85. 
199
 See id.  
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“misdemeanor” sentences ranging from a minimum of six months (destroying bank 
notes)200 to a maximum of 21 years (statutory rape).201  A definition for “felony” 
crept into Ohio law in 1869 when the legislature adopted a “Code of Criminal 
Procedure.”202 A final catch-all title (confusingly named “Acts Repealed”) included 
three definitions: “writing,” “oath,” and “felony.”203  The definition for felony reads: 
“The term ‘felony’ signifies such an offense as may be punished by death or 
imprisonment in the penitentiary.  Any other offense is denominated a 
misdemeanor.”204  The New York definition of felony had started to be adopted even 
in states with existing legal traditions.  This trend would continue.  
E.  A Final Adjustment 
When the U.S. Congress set about revising the federal criminal laws in the early 
twentieth century, a Special Joint Committee on the Revision of the Laws noted that 
“[m]ore than thirty-five States in the Union . . . have defined felonies as offenses 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.”205  However, since federal law (as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court) limited imprisonment in the penitentiary to 
sentences in excess of one year, they settled on the term of imprisonment rather than 
the place of imprisonment to define felony.206  This revised definition was enacted as 
section 335 of Chapter 321, “An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of 
the United States”: “[a]ll offenses which may be punished by death, or imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, shall be deemed felonies.  All other offenses shall be 
deemed misdemeanors.”207 
It was this definition, rather than that of the 1829 New York code, which was 
chosen for inclusion in the Model Penal Code.  In drafting Section 1.04 of the MPC, 
the Committee favored duration of sentence over place of incarceration because they 
believed it would avoid confusion caused by un-repealed, non-MPC provisions in a 
                                                                
200
 Id. at 93.  
201
 Id. at 87.  
202
 1869 Ohio Laws 287.  Despite the name, this was not a code in the usual sense but a 
comprehensive statute on a single—albeit broad—subject.  Ohio’s first official revised edition 
of its statutes was in 1879, followed by a systematic codification of laws in 1910.  Willard 
Campbell, History of Code Revision in Ohio, 26 OHIO BAR 375, 376 (1953), reprinted in 
User’s Guide, OHIO REV. CODE ANN., OHIO CONST. art. I § 1, xlvi (Baldwin 2004). 
203
 1869 Ohio Laws 332, 324. 
204
 1869 Ohio Laws 324.  Current Ohio law provides default definitions for felony and 
misdemeanor based on length of sentence (more than one year versus no more than one year), 
but allows for statutory variations: “Regardless of the penalty that may be imposed, any 
offense specifically classified as a felony is a felony, and any offense specifically classified as 
a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.02 (West 2009). 
205
 S. REP. No. 60-5220, at 13 (1908).  
206
 Id. (citing Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396 (1876)). 
207
 Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, ch. 321, § 335, 35 STAT. 1088, 1152 (1909) 
(codifying, revising, and amending the penal laws of the United States). 
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state’s code.208  To support the choice of one year as the dividing line, they point out 
the need for “a minimum period of approximately this duration . . . to apply any 
substantial program of treatment.”209   
The influence of the Model Penal Code in state code revisions and 
codifications210 has made the use of the “in excess of one year” definition of felony 
common in the United States, although many jurisdictions still use place of 
imprisonment.  The fifteenth edition of Wharton’s Criminal Law,211 published in 
1993, defines felony this way: “[a]n offense which is punishable by death is of 
course a felony.  An offense which is not punishable by death is a felony if it is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year212 or by imprisonment in the 
state prison.”213  
Defining felony in terms of the punishment, rather than by ancient tradition or a 
theoretical model based on moral depravity or harm inflicted, has the advantage of 
simplicity.  But, once the penal system no longer offers the hope of redeeming the 
convict, the consequence of using this definition subverts the more general intent of 
the New York revisers: to base the felony/misdemeanor distinction on the reforming 
program of the penitentiary system.  Of course, the definition of felony is of concern 
only if the felony/misdemeanor distinction makes a difference to the accused or 
convicted criminal—or to society generally. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Does Felony Matter? 
Despite their acceptance of Blackstone’s definition of felony (and their belief that 
the term had become antiquated), the New York revisors felt compelled to supply a 
definition for felony because of its presence in many statutes then in effect.  This is 
still true today.  The felony/misdemeanor distinction applies in both substantive and 
procedural law—varying by jurisdiction.  The distinction is important in the felony 
murder doctrine, which holds that one who, in the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony, causes another’s death is guilty of murder.214  It is also of 
                                                                
208
 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (OFFICIAL DRAFT AND REVISED COMMENTS) § 
1.04, at 70-71 (1985).  The Committee’s commentaries cite an Iowa case, State v. Di Paglia, 
71 N.W.2d 601 (1955), where a conflict in statutes led to the prisoner being condemned to ten 
years in a county jail.  Id. at 71 n.9.   
209
 AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE 23 (Council Draft No. 1, 1953).  
210
 See Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model 
Penal Code,  68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1427-28 (1968); MODEL PENAL CODE, Forward to 10A 
U.L.A. 5 (2001). 
211
 1 TORCIA, supra note 1. 
212
 Id. at 109 (citing statutes from Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, 
and the Model Penal Code).  
213
 Id. (citing statutes from Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho and Wisconsin).  
214
 There are several variations of this doctrine in American law: limiting it to only certain 
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great consequence in the application of enhanced sentencing laws (also known as 
habitual offender, recidivist, and “three-strikes” statutes) that increase a convict’s 
sentence based on prior criminal acts.215  
Wharton lists warrantless arrest, presence of the defendant at trial, and the 
number of permitted peremptory challenges as attributes distinguishing felonies and 
misdemeanors.216  The drafters of the Model Penal Code would add to that list: 
“jurisdictional competence of the courts, requirement of a grand jury indictment, 
availability of bail, size of the jury, right to waive a jury, requirement of a unanimous 
verdict, and rules regarding deposition of witnesses.”217  From a civil libertarian 
point of view, most of these consequences of defining a crime as a felony would lead 
to a preference for a low threshold within the definition.  The more crimes that are 
felonies, the better, since this would extend constitutional and procedural protections 
to more suspects.  
On the other hand, increasing the number of crimes defined as felonies would 
expose more convicted criminals to harsher sentences under the felony-murder rule 
and habitual criminal statutes.  Additionally, there has been a growing recognition 
over the last several decades of the serious social, economic, and political problems 
caused by the “collateral consequences” of a felony conviction: civil disabilities 
imposed on convicts independently of their criminal sentence.  These problems were 
first addressed systematically in 1961 with the drafting of Article 306 of the Model 
Penal Code, “Loss and Restoration of Rights Incident to Conviction or 
Imprisonment.”218  The measures in Article 306, which focus primarily on restoring 
civil rights after the convict is released from prison, were motivated by the belief, 
still alive in the 1960s, that corrections worked.  Civil disqualifications were seen as 
“a major correctional problem, since the rehabilitative efforts of the correctional 
people are thwarted at every turn by the, in effect, societal rejection of the prisoner, 
even after the correctional people think that he has made real progress.”219  
“Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction” were also discussed in a task 
force report supplementing the widely publicized 1967 report of the President’s 
Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.220    
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In 1970, the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review published a massive compilation 
of state and federal laws creating civil disabilities and loss of benefits for convicts.221  
The consequences they identified were categorized as: loss of citizenship, loss of 
voting rights, loss of the right to hold public office, loss of the ability to serve as a 
juror or court-appointed fiduciary, and loss of the capacity to litigate, testify, and 
make contracts; they also list the loss of employment opportunities and economic 
benefits such as pensions and workmen’s compensation.222  Recent scholarship has 
gone beyond looking at the consequences for the convict by examining the social and 
economic costs of conviction on families of convicts and the communities they live 
in.223  
In 2004, the American Bar Association published new standards covering 
collateral sanctions,224 noting that “[t]he collateral consequences of conviction have 
been increasing steadily in variety and severity for the past twenty years, and their 
lingering effects have become increasingly difficult to shake off.”225  In contrast to 
the Model Penal Code’s emphasis on post-incarceration restoration of civil status, 
the ABA Standards call for limiting civil sanctions for convicts, addressing their 
imposition at sentencing, and prohibiting post-release discrimination.226 In light of 
these concerns, it would seem that at least some social and economic goals would be 
better served by setting the threshold for felony higher, thereby reducing the number 
of convictions that entail barriers to successful reentry of the convict into society.   
However, the libertarian interest in extending protections to the suspect, and the 
liberal interest in promoting social justice are at odds here.  The Model Penal Code 
and ABA Standards seek to balance these competing interests by limiting or 
removing the collateral civil sanctions, rather than by reducing the number of crimes 
that are classified as felonies.  It may, however, be useful to consider a different 
approach and look at what outcomes we might see if either Livingston’s criminal 
code or a modified common law definition of felony had prevailed nationally.    
B.  Possibilities 
Livingston’s criminal code for Louisiana proved too radical a departure from 
existing law and was never enacted.  Livingston, of course, did not use the word 
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“felony” in his code.227  However, his integrated approach to penal law provided for 
collateral consequences to be combined with incarceration and customized for each 
crime.228  This is a similar approach to that suggested by ABA Standard 19-2.1, 
which calls for legislation to tie particular collateral sanctions to particular 
offenses.229  Such an integrated and thoroughgoing reform would certainly be an 
effective solution to the collateral consequences problem.  But such a dramatic break 
with the past is—as Livingston discovered—difficult to achieve.   
Maryland departed from the national trend towards codifying the criminal law by 
staying in place, and the persistence of a modified common law definition of felony 
presents some interesting opportunities.  In Maryland, the legislature can designate a 
crime as either a misdemeanor or a felony, irrespective of the sentence imposed.  
This idiosyncratic common law approach allows the felony designation to be 
reserved for crimes the State considers especially serious, while permitting tougher 
sentences generally if this meets the needs of the legislature.  An example of how 
this might work can be found in a recent addition to Maryland’s statute on second 
degree (simple) assault.230  The basic crime of second degree assault is a 
misdemeanor punished by imprisonment up to ten years and a fine.  The newly 
inserted provision is for second degree assault on a law enforcement officer; it is 
designated a felony, but carries the same sentence as the misdemeanor—ten years 
imprisonment and a fine.231  While a statutory scheme that assigns the sentence and 
designation as felony or misdemeanor separately can lead to piecemeal and 
inconsistent results, it also allows for fine distinctions as to which acts merit the full 
consequences (including collateral consequences) of a felony conviction.  It would 
also allow the legislature to be tough on crime with longer sentences without adding 
to the burden on ex-convicts reentering society, and their families. 
In the great majority of states, of course, the enacted definition is that derived 
from the New York Revised Statutes of 1829.  The revisors, faced with the need to 
supply content to a concept emptied of meaning by the penal reform movement, 
chose a definition based on those reforms: a crime that merits the reformative 
program of the penitentiary.  Using the definition of felony to restrict the rights of 
convicts with collateral consequences after their release was never their intent.  It is 
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easy to imagine, therefore, that those earnest young men, who believed in the 
redemptive power of corrections, would be troubled by the institutionalized social 
stigma attached to a felony conviction.  As their intent was to return productive 
citizens to the community, it is likely that they would disfavor a system that burdens 
the released convict with additional disabilities.  Given the definition of felony by 
the punishment imposed, that intent might be better served by increasing the 
threshold for felony from one year to—perhaps—five years.232 
In raising the bar on felonies, however, the problem of dual effect remains: 
decreasing the number of convicted felons affected by collateral consequences also 
decreases the number of accused felons subject to procedural and constitutional 
protections.  This might be avoided by, conceptually, reestablishing the distinction 
between “felony” and “infamous crime,” with disabilities attaching to felonies, and 
constitutional and procedural protections attaching to infamous crimes. The two 
terms could then be associated with different thresholds—e.g., five years or more for 
felonies, and one year or less for infamous crimes.233  Limiting the number of 
felonies in a state would not affect this constitutional protection and other safeguards 
linked to infamous crimes. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In post-Revolutionary America, those who took up the task of adapting the laws 
inherited from the colonial era had to contend with demands for reform as well as 
resistance from those comfortable with common law jurisprudence.  Criminal law 
was just one part of that transformation, and the definition of felony was one small 
part of the criminal law.  But, the choices made in creating that definition are 
illustrative of the process, and the definition is important in its own right because of 
the importance of the concept of felony in the current debate over collateral 
consequences.  The gradual evolution of the common law in Maryland and Edward 
Livingston’s attempt to entirely supplant it in Louisiana were at opposite ends of the 
spectrum of legal reform.  The approach of the New York revisors—codifying and 
revising but not rejecting the common law—proved highly successful and adaptable 
to the needs of newly admitted states and, eventually, to other states seeking to 
codify their laws.   
How “felony” is defined makes a difference for the accused and convicted 
criminal and for society.  Redefining it to raise the bar on felonies would be one way 
to change the lives of ex-convicts and the communities to which they eventually 
return, and one which fulfills the intent of the creators of the original definition.  
Redefining it in a way that separates the concepts of felony and infamous crime 
would do so without impairing important safeguards for the accused. 
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